

Sign Oral History Project

Oral History Interview with Thomas G. Goduto (USAF, Captain, ret.)

B-52 Electronics Warfare Officer (EWO),
Minot AFB, ND, 24 October 1968

Date: 20 February 2001

Interviewer: Thomas Tulien

TRT: 2:30 hours

Format: BETA-SP

Copyright: AFS/Dialogue Productions LLC, Minneapolis, MN 55404.

Transcription by the National Institute for Discovery Science with additional editing by
Thomas Tulien.

NOTICE

This is a transcript of a tape-recorded interview conducted for the Sign Oral History Project and is essentially a transcript of the spoken, rather than the written word.

RESTRICTIONS

This oral history transcript may be read, quoted from, cited, and reproduced for purposes of research. It may not be published in whole or part except by permission of the copyright holder.

Thomas Tulien

Sign Oral History Project

INT: So February 20, 2001 we're here with Tom Goduto.
You're from St. Paul originally?

TOM: St. Paul originally, Minnesota.

INT: How did you end up in the Air Force?

TOM: Well, let's see. I graduated from high school in 1957 and then I went to [Nezra] Hall Seminary, St. Thomas College and the University of Minnesota. While I was at the University of Minnesota, after I graduated from general college I went into institute of technology and civil engineering, and then I got a notice from the draft board that said, 'Mr. Goduto, we see that you have a student deferment for 5 years and we see your academic record shows you're not within 2 years of graduation, and

we'd like you to come and take a physical and a mental test.' So I felt that I was going to be going to Viet Nam with the rest of the guys and I looked around to see what was available. I always was fascinated with aircraft and flying, and so I went to the Navy and I couldn't get into the Navy because of hearing level, and I could not get into the pilot program because of hearing level but I could get into a navigator program called, 'Aviation Cadets,' with 2 years of college, so I did that. I went into Aviation Cadets in 1963—in the first part of 1965 they did away with that program, so to get a commission in the Air Force after 1965, you had to have a 4-year bachelor's degree.

INT: What year was that?

TOM: I went in December of 1962 and Aviation Cadets was at James Connelly Air Force Base, Waco, Texas. That was a 1-year program at that time, where they combined the navigational course, all electronics—they added a whole bunch of electronics in at that time, and then normal military training like boot camp. I graduated with aeronautical rating and navigator, and a commission as a 2nd Lieutenant.

INT: So you were already commissioned at the end of your first year?

TOM: First year, so the year I was an aviation cadet I wasn't commissioned, so actually my military career, a 20-year career was 20 years in the service, but only 19 of that was commission time, 'cause there was the one-year up front that I was an aviation cadet.

INT: But you retired with full retirement from the Air Force?

TOM: Oh yeah. I graduated on time, never washed back, December 1963. And my first assignment was Minot, North Dakota, although in-between I had to go to electronic warfare officer school. That's where I was assigned on navigation training, to Mather Air Force Base, and that was about a 7-month program—electronic warfare officer school. Then after that I had to go to a couple miscellaneous courses to include survival training. And then I reported to Castle Air Force Base in probably August or September of 1964 for B-52 combat crew training, and then I went to Minot, North Dakota.

INT: Was Castle the principal B-52 training facility?

TOM: Castle was the combat crew training, yeah, for B-52's.

INT: Okay. And then another question too, did all EWO's come from navigation school?

- TOM:** Yeah. It was kind of a tough deal because you had to be a navigator, and then basically you were betting your navigator wings that you'd graduate from electronic warfare officer school, because if you didn't you washed out of all flying.
- INT:** I saw a program recently, talking about EWO's—there were these guys in Viet Nam 'The Weasels' I think they were called? But, there were two guys—the pilot and EWO, and they went in, you know, and they drew fire. This guy said he could make a funny noise and the pilot would know what he was talking about. They were that close.
- TOM:** Yeah, there was a pilot—Will Harkins. I hope that your wife doesn't see this, but Will Harkins, my pilot and I applied for what you're talking about, 'Wild Weasels.' We weren't selected for whatever reason. It was dangerous work. But of course you were in a lot a better performing aircraft than a B-52, a lumbering thing, you know, if you were in an F-4 or F-105 you could maneuver a lot more quicker but there were casualties associated with that.
- INT:** Yeah. And some of those guys flew a hundred missions in the face of death. That was interesting to see, you know, one never hears much about the EWO's.
- TOM:** No. We were back-seaters.
- INT:** From Castle you went up to Minot?
- TOM:** I reported there in January of 1965 as a 2nd Lieutenant. I was commissioned to 2nd Lieutenant in December of '63, and in January of '65 I was still a 2nd Lieutenant. So one achievement in my life was when I got to Minot I did very well at upgrading and doing the B-52H difference training, and when I took my Stanboard I got a 'Highly Qualified,' but I was a 2nd Lieutenant. There was a regulation in SAC that you had to be at least a 1st Lieutenant in order to sit nuclear work, so I received a spot promotion to 1st Lieutenant and 2 hours later I was on alert.
- INT:** Give us some idea of what was going on in the early '60s there.
- TOM:** Minot? Well, it was a 15 UE—unit equipped base, so we had 15 B-52's, 6 people per crew, but 27 crews. Now that was a mix of—select crews, lead crews, ready crews, and unready crews, and X crews. When you got to a unit and became qualified in an airplane you were assigned to a crew, and crew integrity was one way of assuring maximum performance of the manpower to be able to operate the airplane, its weapon systems and defensive systems to get it to a target safely. So you stayed together as a crew as much as possible although there were crew changes. People

would go PCS [Permanent Change of Station], get out of the service but they tried to keep crews together.

INT: Where did you start out in the hierarchy?

TOM: When I got there I had to do my B-52 H difference training, because at Castle I flew D and F-models, so when you get there you have to learn a new airplane. So when you completed that you were assigned to a crew. My very first crew I took the place of a guy that was going PCS, so that was crew [E]-12. Warren Hingle was the pilot of that crew. We did all of our alert time and all of our flying together, although that doesn't mean that you wouldn't be called upon to substitute into somebody else's crew if the individual was sick or on emergency leave or something like that. So there was a shifting around of crewmembers, but they always tried to keep crews together the best they could. They called it an integral crew.

INT: So that was your training and then you moved up?

TOM: Became an instructor, and then I got a position in Stanboard. Crews S-01, S-05 and S-06 were the Stanboard crews, and I think my first assignment there was crew S-06.

INT: Okay. So then you worked your way up to the Stanboard crew? Explain that a little bit. Talk about the Stanboard crews, 'cause they really were sort of the top—

TOM: They were the most proficient and the proficiency was personal capability and experience, you know? Once you became an instructor you actually learned your job more than you ever did when you were just a student.

INT: What was your normal routine?

TOM: A lot of flying because we had to fly our own sorties and then we had to fly evaluations with other crews on missions. And usually to complete somebody you had to have a whole bunch of given activity on a sortie, and let's say you couldn't go low level, you couldn't get a refueling, you couldn't do this or that, then you had to fly with that individual again for the activity that you missed in order to evaluate that phase of flight. And because of that, completing somebody on a Stanboard ride in one flight was not that often of an occurrence. I was flying probably 8 or 9 times a month, but then we had to sit a full compliment of alert which even got more strenuous because there were crews rotating TDY to Arc Light, or flying out of Guam and Thailand for the Viet Nam effort. So we were actually sitting alert one week—7 days, then we would have crew rest and recuperation for half the time you were on. If we said 7 days, then we had 3 and ½ days that we were gold and we could not be touched, but after that

we would fly. I might fly 2 times in that following week, and then go back out on alert again. If you were on a week-off a week where you did your flying, and then back on, that was a back-to-back alert tour. And we did a lot of back to backs. And also during this period of time it was the first of do more with less. I said we started out with 27 crews—we were probably down to 18 crews and still had to fly the airplanes, fly the flying time, make sure everybody was— It was plush in the beginning. There were enough people for all the crew positions, and the pilots were the hardest position because there was a shortage of pilots. #1 was Viet Nam. #2 was, once a pilot he could go fly for an airlines, which was a lot more attractive then getting your butt shot at in Viet Nam.

INT: Do you remember that specific flight? I'm just curious.

TOM: Yeah.

INT: You do? Why do you remember it?

TOM: Because of the event that...

INT: [Inaudible—both talking at once].

TOM: Yeah.

INT: Can you give us the details of the sortie that you were on at the time?

TOM: Sure—well, I can't remember that. You know, they were all—The sortie was generic. It simulated a wartime sortie, a wartime mission and of course you had take off, and sometimes you had heavy weight take offs, which you wouldn't do all the time 'cause it was a lot of stress on the airplane. Well, you took off, climbed out, normally in the beginning of the mission you would refuel first, because there was a tanker coordination, and the timing of that was easier to control if you both did that right away.

INT: And you'd do that over North Dakota?

TOM: Yes, but it didn't have to be—refueling tracks are all the way across the United States, and not necessarily in North Dakota, but once you left Minot, North Dakota airspace was only restricted by Canada. We wouldn't want to fly into Canada, and we wouldn't want to fly into Mexico but other than we'd go all over.

INT: Oh, anywhere you wanted to go?

TOM: Yeah. We're gonna fly for 8 or 10 hours. I mean its 450 nauts for 10 hours, that's 4,500 miles, you know?

INT: So were you flying up to Alaska?

TOM: No, because of Canada. We did fly some missions but normally we stayed in the Conus United States, and after you'd take off you'd go refuel, and you refuel on a refueling track, and there was lots of different refueling tracks. You didn't necessarily refuel with a tanker out of Minot. You could refuel a tanker out of Grissom Air Force Base, or wherever.

You knew who your tanker was gonna be, where he was from, what his call sign was and then you would meet at a rendezvous time and point, and then you refuel. And after refueling, then you normally went into a nav leg, because on a war mission you gotta get there, and high and low-level navigation. Well, a high level navigation you had to do a nav leg. Normally that was an hour and a half, and we normally did celestial. It was daytime, you did day celestial with the sun and then at night you did stars. My job on the airplane was doing all the celestial observations for the navigator who's doing the nav leg downstairs. And on that portion, it was the navs training portion. Pilots were eating their flight lunch. In the refueling pilots portion of their training, and the navs eating his flight lunch. And then before you got your target area you'd fly low-level for an hour.

INT: Low-level meaning what kind of altitude?

TOM: As low as 400 feet, normally around 800-1000 feet. You could fly—let's see, I lose track between the B-1 and the B-52. One was terrain following in the B-1, but this was terrain avoidance—T.A. So we had equipment on the airplane that would show you if something was higher so you could fly an altitude generally lower and you just watch for things ahead of you and then you would get over them—

INT: So you had front radar?

TOM: Front radar, yep. And so you do the low-level navigation, then you'd get into the target area, then you'd do bomb delivery and electronic warfare. There would be a radar bomb scoring site would take the airplane under radar, well, precise radar control and it would determine where you released your weapon. There would be a release tone in the airplane.

INT: So this is a pre-set place?

TOM: Yes. You would go to a bomb plot, Hastings bomb plot, La Junta bomb plot—

INT: And these were out in the desert?

TOM: No, not necessarily. Hastings was Hasting, Nebraska. La Junta was La Junta, Colorado. There was different RBS radar bomb scoring sites, and they all had an electronic warfare scoring capability where the EW would throw up simulated threat signals, and then the EW would counter those so that we wouldn't get shot down, but it would be able to track us and get tracking and targeting information on us so that we would be able to deliver our weapons. The major objective of every mission was delivering the weapons to the target in any way, shape or form that you could. So that's what we were all training for and it took a whole crew to do that.

INT: Were the navigators involved in the re-fueling?

TOM: We would do what we call a rendezvous and when you did a rendezvous, the goal was to come up behind the tanker. Up underneath. And then when you got to the ARCP—Air Re-fueling Control Point, then we could begin re-fueling. So then we would move into what they called the pre-contact position and in the contact position. And once the rendezvous was complete, the radar didn't have any job.

INT: So primarily the pilots were doing this visually?

TOM: After the rendezvous was complete and you did have the tanker visually, because a lot of times you're in clouds and whatever, you had to have the tanker visual and then you would do the rest of the procedures for re-fueling.

INT: The only reason I mentioned that is because, you know, Pat McCaslin mentioned that by the return they had on the unidentified object, they knew it was much larger than a KC-135 because they knew what the size of a KC-135 on the navigation scope, you see.

TOM: In order to do a rendezvous with a tanker, there was a mode of the radar that would be able to paint another airborne object, instead of painting the ground.

INT: Are we talking station keeping, or?

TOM: I think that there was a term that the radar would go into station keeping mode, but station keeping means that one aircraft will keep its station relative to another aircraft. That's station keeping. And then if the radar is responsible for the station keeping other than the pilot's eyes or whatever, well, then they were in that radar mode in order to accomplish that. It probably was a very narrow beam of radar pulse that would go out and then return to the aircraft.

INT: Well, since you're a navigator, can you explain what systems were on that aircraft?

TOM: No, I was a navigator, but with different kind of equipment in my navigator training then when we went to B-52's. I would not be the person to ask about that.

INT: Well, for example, how many radar systems were on board?

TOM: There was one radar system, but it had the several different modes. But there were 2 scopes off the same radar. In fact you'd hear the antenna of the radar sectoring, 'Boom, boom, boom' back and forth when the radar was looking in different directions and different scan rates. Under the floor of the nose of the airplane there was a big ray dome up there that if they were to work on that radar antenna, they would drop this ray dome up there and then it made the airplane look kind of funny because you'd lose the shape of the airplane. So it was under the pilots, but the guts and workings of the radar were further back in the airplane. I'm just talking about the antenna.

INT: Could it see behind the aircraft?

TOM: I wouldn't be able to tell you what the limitations of being able to see behind the airplane were, but if there was something right behind the airplane, we had radar for that, but it was the gunner's. Normally anybody that was gonna pursue the airplane and shoot at us would end up behind us in order to do that, so the gunner's radar pointed to the rear of the airplane. Um...but the aircraft's radar would not be able to see directly behind or at the same level. Now out in front of us it could see a little higher than the plane of the aircraft, but not a whole lot.

But it was a pretty good radar in that I think where we were, I was telling you that there was 2 radar scopes, and the radar navigator, who's the bombardier, or the more accomplished navigator his scope was probably at least a foot wide. It was rather large and it had good resolution, and he could see his scope very well. Now the navigator had a repeater scope that was smaller in size—maybe 6-8 inches. So there were 2 scopes downstairs, but whatever was on one was on the other. The radar navigator—he had all the bombing equipment, and the navigator had navigational equipment.

The radar navigator was an experienced navigator who was upgraded into that position. Two guys could both navigate. One guy, especially if the guy in the right seat, the navigator wasn't real experienced, he couldn't drop a bomb and do some of the stuff that the radar navigator could do. But he eventually learned it, 'cause he's sitting this far from the guy, you

know, for hours and hours, and so they learn each other's position just by virtue of being there and doing that.

INT: And what sort of equipment did you have available to you? Could you explain the types of equipment that you were using?

TOM: Yeah, I was the defensive systems—the gunner and myself try to make sure that the airplane could get to its target. And my equipment was jammers, electronic jammers, flares, and chaff, and then in order to be able to use those things, we had receiving systems that had to be electronic emissions from some other source that we could take, analyze, determine what it was, and counter that threat to the airplane.

INT: You're in enemy territory looking for radar?

TOM: More specifically we're looking for weapon control radars, whether that be anti-aircraft or SAM missiles or other fighter aircraft.

INT: So you could identify a SAM missile by its radar signature?

TOM: Oh yeah. I could say what kind of SAM it was. And I could say what mode it was in. Oh yeah, we were heavily trained.

INT: And you could determine distance and location for that system?

TOM: Yeah, we could. I had a receiver that would show intensity of the signal and direction, and then I would have a receiver that would show frequency, and I could analyze a signal to determine lots of different parameters. So I knew everything about it, and I would know how best to counter it. Electronic countermeasures—that's what I was.

INT: And so...okay. So how would you counter it—you could throw chaff out into the air, right?

TOM: Yep, if that would be appropriate.

INT: Also in electronic jamming how did that function?

TOM: It was a radio transmitter that would transmit a signal. I would be able to adjust its frequency to match somebody else's frequency and it would generally flood their equipment, and therefore they were receiving some usable information, and now their scope is white and they can't tell where we are or anything about us.

INT: Now was that an effective countermeasure? They come up with countermeasures to that?

TOM: Yeah, there are electronic counter-countermeasures, sure. Our radar was susceptible to jamming and I had to be careful of that, but I would stay away from our radars signal. We would coordinate that during the portion of the flight. And if the signal that was coming in—let's say it would move its frequency and I wasn't alert to that frequency change, then the ground facility is getting usable information on us. So I have to quick counter that. In my job timing was important, I had to get things countered quickly and that was my grading criteria—were my countermeasures effective against it and was the timing quick. It was like dropping a bomb. If we didn't drop the bomb and the bomb didn't hit close to where we intended it to then we fail that attempt. We trained to be able to be effective.

INT: In your area, how many different types of machines are you working with?

TOM: Just roughly speaking I would say 30 or 35. They would do different things at different frequencies for different uses. I had receivers, transmitters and expendable type things. Then they all had different settings.

INT: And some of them probably recorded data?

TOM: At that period of time we didn't have a recorder on the airplane. In other words, in reference to what we're gonna talk about, you'd say, 'Gee, did you record anything?' Well, we didn't have recorders then. The airplanes that flew over Viet Nam did have recorders. So anything that was on a radio, said on the intercom or any of the other information that was audio capable to any crewmember was recorded. Well, we didn't have that in the B-52's. We were a one-time mission type-thing.

INT: Yeah, you weren't supposed to see action, were you? You flew over it.

TOM: We trained the dickens out of those airplanes and us to be ready to do 'em, but we never had to do 'em.

INT: So this mission you were flying 24th October, standard training mission—let's talk about what you remember of the event on the return to Minot.

TOM: Yeah, you asked about phases of flight before, and it was take-off, climb out, refueling, navigation leg, low level nav bombing, return to base, and then pilot's work. And pilot's work either consisted of instrument work at altitude, or low altitude work around the field to include touch and go's. And I couldn't tell you right now the duration of that sortie. In fact, I could tell you that the end of the sortie was at night—in the middle of the night and so speculating without memory what I did when we were getting

back is I was trying to stay awake and maybe not, but I had a check list that I personally had to run with my equipment prior to penetration. I had to do certain things, and I would use my checklist and I would end up powered down.

INT: By the time you landed?

TOM: No, by the time we were on a penetration. Penetration means leaving flight level 200—20,000 feet, and starting down to the runway.

INT: So at that point your equipment's shut down—you're ready for a nap?

TOM: You bet. I probably napped prior to having to do the checklist, but now one of my crew position responsibilities was monitoring the HF radio—high frequency radio, single-side band and no matter where we were in the United States, our command post could always raise us on HF radio, and I could communicate back to the command post. That was my job on the airplane. And then when we got into the local area, we had 2 UHF radios, okay? Now we had HF, we had 2 UHF radios and one VHF, which was...

INT: So you had 3 communications devices?

TOM: That's right. HF, and 2 UHF.

INT: Okay.

TOM: And I want to explain the UHF antennas—there was radio 1 and radio 2 UHF. The antennas for those were located on different parts of the airplane. One was low and forward, the other was up in the back and the reason for that was a lot of times with the UHF radio the reception and the transmission quality was good using one, depending on where you were relative to one site or the other. Or maybe you had one weak radio, or maybe one radio wasn't up during the flight. He wouldn't take off with it that way, but, you know, things break.

INT: Question—did that happen anytime that your radios went out?

TOM: Sure. Yeah, you'd lose a radio.

INT: So it was not uncommon?

TOM: Yeah well, it wasn't uncommon but it wasn't a normality. You could get in a position where you'd be down to one UHF radio, which was kind of a problem, because then you had to do a lot of frequency changes depending on whom you had to speak to. But normally, you had two operative UHF radios. When we got back in the local area, we would put one of 'em on

the command post frequency and the other on ATC, whether that is Center, Minot Approach Control, or Minot Tower or Minot Ground. The UHF that was on command post became my responsibility, because the pilots would be busy doing pilot work and they would just be interested in air traffic control communications, and not interested in the command post, where I would listen to the command post and communicate with them and let the crew members know what the command post wanted, or the pilots say, 'Call up the command post and tell them this.' See he wouldn't do it himself. He'd ask me to do it.

INT: So they were just concerned with control tower?

TOM: Under whatever control we were under, whether that's Center or Approach or tower. See, the tower is a very limited thing. The Departure Control and Approach Control is about a 50-mile radius control. Once the Center gives you up, or once you leave Center's control and go to Approach Control, you change the frequency of your radio and you talk to different people and they're looking at you on different radars.

INT: Does that mean there's radar 50 miles around the air base?

TOM: No, but one in the middle that sees out 50 miles, see? Or maybe a couple. Maybe there was some kind of redundancy so that if they lost—

INT: How was ADC associated with Minot? They had a radar station about 20-30 miles from the base?

TOM: Yeah. Okay, that was a long, long, range radar warning system.

INT: Let's walk through this event. I mean what do you recall?

TOM: We were getting into the local area and I was probably sleepy. Got my equipment shut down and then sleepy changed to alert. 'What in the heck is that thing?' or somebody said, 'If you see any [inaudible]?' and that was probably on the command post radio.

INT: Okay. So you're hearing this over your headphones?

TOM: Yeah. I'm hearing air traffic control, one of the UHF, I'm hearing the command post, and since we're back on the local area I don't have to listen to the HF anymore, so I probably had the HF shut down, okay? And somebody said, 'Are you seeing anything?' or Brad—the way I recall was that we were at altitude and Brad saw something. That's the way I remember it. Since after talking to Jim and maybe even yourself a little bit maybe that isn't the case right then, but that's the way I remember it—that we saw something at that time at altitude. Now whether I'm confusing that

with the first time that we were in the holding pattern area, or the second time, okay. So, once I was aware that some unusual events were occurring, I wasn't sleepy anymore, nobody on the airplane was. We were all kinda interested in that obviously, and especially if Brad our co-pilot either saw something or was working it, we were all with him mentally and ready to support paying attention, yep.

INT: Do you remember McCaslin saying anything?

TOM: Yeah, but again, I'm confused at whether it would've been the first time that we were at altitude holding, or the second time, but yeah. The navigators became very interested and they were looking all the time for whatever may be in proximity to our aircraft. And at some time they found it. And then I have to tell you too that contrary to my checklist, I powered my receiver equipment back up.

INT: You did?

TOM: Yes, which is a big drain on the power of the aircraft, but I felt that was warranted at that time, so I did. And now again, whether that was the first time that we were at altitude flight level 200 or the second time I can't tell you, but I did turn my equipment back on.

INT: Okay, in the documents Colonel Werlich, who was the UFO officer at Minot, you know, reported to Wright-Patterson under AFR 80-17, said in one of these memos that the EWO had turned his equipment off and did not turn it back on.

TOM: Yeah, that was not correct, I did.

INT: Did you talk with Werlich? Do you remember him interviewing you or anything?

TOM: No. He may have talked to another electronic warfare officer and found out what procedures were that you would be in a shut down condition during that phase of flight in a local area. But because of the events that were happening, like the radar was seeing something I started thinking, 'Maybe there will be something electronic I can see.' Now this becomes a confusion too. When I was lower level and in a populated area, one section of my frequency spectrum was kind of flooded with signals, and it was TV and a lot of different signals. But it was normal to see a bunch of things. No matter what was there, I would've listened and analyzed the signal, and I felt that I didn't find anything unusual or strange. There were signals, but if there was something close to the airplane and it was a source of power emission or some type of emission, I would think that it would be possible to be in the frequencies that I was able to monitor.

- INT:** If it were behind the airplane would that be a factor?
- TOM:** No, my equipment received all the way around.
- INT:** If McCaslin's got this on his radarscope and it's a large object and he knows that it approached the plane very quickly from behind, you would think that your devices would have some way of detecting that same object.
- TOM:** If there was an emission from that object and it was in—
- INT:** Only if it was emitting?
- TOM:** Yeah. Whatever kind of emission it'd be—whether it was an intentional emission or just a circumstantial emission because of whatever the object was, and it happened to have been in the frequency range of what I was able to view or listen to. I think that Jim told me that Pat McCaslin said that the EW said he had some strange signals.
- INT:** Yeah.
- TOM:** I don't believe I would've said, 'I've got some strange signals' and whatever. I might've said, 'I've got signals' and his interpretation of that might've been that I was receiving some odd stuff. But to this day I'd have to say that I could not substantiate anything on my equipment that was unusual. At some point prior to the full stop landing I would've shut down the equipment so that the power requirements of the aircraft were available for other things. And we penetrated. Penetrated means you hit this fix and you put the gear down and you start a descent and headings into your drop and panned up on your final approach course. And again, whether it was the first time or the second time, the navigators or the co-pilot or both said, 'Whatever that is, it's staying right with us.' Okay. Now this is the time also that, after talking to Jim I recalled that we did have UHF problems. Now don't forget, I told you that the antennas were in different positions for the different radios—radio 1, radio 2. And sometimes you had to switch the radios and you had a better response. And reading the transcript after my first interview with Jim, I could see where the approach control lost contact with us. In other words, they would transmit to us and we wouldn't hear it. Well we didn't know we had radio problems because we weren't hearing anything. Only after a certain period of time would go by if we haven't heard something you'd suspect, you know, you'd probably say, 'Minot approach, are you reading this radio?' And then if they didn't answer we'd say, 'Hey, let's switch the radios.' That probably occurred on that flight and in fact I could say that it did.

- INT:** In the document—I mean both radios went out while that—
- TOM:** One would be command post one would—both radios? Okay. It could've been...let's say if I was listening to the command post radio and they were on approach control, and I wasn't hearing anything from the command post, usual condition, right? I don't care if they're not talking to me. But as soon as we would start switching around, or we tried transmitting, and now this all came back. Don't forget, we didn't land without communications, okay. So therefore one would deduce, if there was something in proximity to the airplane and the radios weren't usable—they were operating, but they weren't usable, but there was probably a correlation to that.
- INT:** You guys can't hear them and they can hear you. They're giving you instructions and they're hearing the squawking and then they asked you if there was a problem to send a May Day, and then they said, 'We hear no May Day.'
- TOM:** Yeah, what the quick terminology that is identific—IFF, identification friend or foe, it's a burst of transmitted energy with a code to it and they would've said, 'Squawk ident.' Okay, and we would've done that, okay?
- INT:** You did do that and they did hear that.
- TOM:** Yeah. So and then when I was talking about my scope and frequencies and emissions, well, I guess what we're talking about is the possible energy field.
- INT:** Which is odd that you didn't pick something up if the things affecting the radio, your equipment should detect something, right?
- TOM:** Yeah, but in hindsight and Monday morning quarterbacking, you would say, 'My Gosh.' you know? Maybe an energy field blocked up—but in real time in the airplane we're switching radios around and we're okay, you know. We got back in contact and we weren't making a whole bunch of conclusions at that time that, 'Well jeez, you know, when that thing is close to us we can't communicate.' No. Nobody every said anything like that, or nobody even became excited about the situation—I mean, it wasn't...
- INT:** Well, let me ask you this. This...I'm not...this isn't part of your recall, but it seems to be part of most people's recall, that the object trailed you for awhile. In fact, the object trailed you for almost 25 miles because you were 35 miles out, and it dropped away from the B-52 at 10 miles out.

- TOM:** Okay. My recollection to that was that the radar was able to paint it during this period of time and the biggest thing I remember is excitement by saying, 'There it is!' It's there and station keeping with us. In other words, where we were going, it was going rela—in a position relative to our airplane. And then all of a sudden, the thing, the big excitement from downstairs was, 'It's gone!' and the sweeps meant that it didn't sweep, you know, that they weren't able to watch it go away. Just all of a sudden it was gone, which meant that it moved very fast to get away, that fast without being recorded in a sweep.
- INT:** Now what Pat remembers from what he could observe on the radar screen, he knew it dropped.
- TOM:** You mean dropped altitude-wise?
- INT:** Descended. Yes.
- TOM:** Descended. Well flight level 200 is 20,000 feet, but we're going down, we're descending down to probably 1,000—1,200 feet. That was pattern altitude, okay? We would've leveled at 1,200 feet. Once you get below 17,000 or 15,000 you no longer say 'flight level', you now say regular altitude. So once we left flight level two zero zero, 20,000 feet and we're going down to 1,200 feet, okay? So that's where we would've been. If it went lower, it was certainly safe to go lower. I mean you can go all the way down to a hundred feet above the ground.
- INT:** Now, it's at that point that the radios come back on when this thing drops away.
- TOM:** It would've been, yeah, by that time frame, I guess. Without putting the idea or words in my mouth that would be normal because we would've needed those radios to make an approach. We would've had to have been cleared for an approach to the field.
- INT:** Yeah. Can you land that aircraft without radios?
- TOM:** Yep. But there are procedures and we weren't in that condition.
- INT:** Yeah, because what the...and this is interesting because both Werlich and the control tower said that they never really heard a radio go out that way before, because it kept going out mid-word. But to them, it was odd the way the radio cut out.
- TOM:** A radio that's crumping would probably get scratchy, weaker. If it would go immediately, no, that would be unusual. I'd had not heard that. I didn't

know that that was— Yeah, that's interesting. That would be some indication of the type of radiation that was affecting the radio system.

It would be very black and white. It would be here it is and here it isn't. You know, it would be...whether that's a matter of distance or what direction or—

[Switches tape]

TOM: We're penetrating, which means then we would be getting ready to make an approach. And the runways there, I think, were 29 and 11, so the wind was such that we were using 11, which was not the normal runway. Normally we used 29 'cause prevailing winds were out of the west, which means this night they would've been out of the east. I couldn't tell you what kind of an approach we made. Normally the approaches would either have been, well, one of 3 kinds. ILS—Instrument Landing System approach, a GCA—Ground Control Precision approach or a non-precision approach, so it didn't make any difference, but all 3 had to do with a certain distance away from the runway where you would start your descent beyond the glide slope that would bring it to the runway. And that was about 6 or 7 miles, roughly. And then you'd be on the glide slope as you're coming down and then if we got down to 200 feet then the decision of the pilot was either to land or to go around, and I don't believe we did a touch and go. I think we did a low approach, which meant that when we hit 200 feet the pilot would've put the power back on the airplane and just by so doing, that would make the aircraft hold its altitude and probably ascend a little bit. And then when we got down the runway, then the radar approach control would've told us when to turn off the runway heading, which would've been 110, and then normally would turn you at 90°, but in this case the pattern wasn't 90°. They'd turn us more than 90° to a northerly direction, which you saw here, for a certain amount of time or distance, and then they would turn us again.

INT: Bring you right back around?

TOM: They would. And they were the ones doing it. We weren't doing it on our own. In other words, our radar wasn't telling the pilot when to turn or whatever. The ground would tell us when to turn.

INT: Let me ask you this—When you guys were coming down for your approach and that object continued to descend he [McCaslin] set his crosshairs. He knew where that thing was on the ground.

TOM: Yeah. Normally what he would do was he'd put the crosshairs on the end of the runway, because that's where we want to go, right? Well, if you got

the crosshairs on the end of the runway, and you've got something else on the radar, now you know the relative distance and direction from the end of the runway.

- INT:** When the General Officer came on the radio he ordered the pilot to go around and over fly the object, and they basically knew what the coordinates for that object were. That's the question. How would they know that if they didn't have it on their radar?
- TOM:** How would we know it?
- INT:** How would anybody know it for that matter?
- TOM:** If we didn't have it on the radar?
- INT:** Well, McCaslin's saying that he knew because somehow he was able to record where that object descended, so if you guys had to fly back over it he would be the one to direct you. There was a computer on board to drop those bombs, right?
- TOM:** Yeah.
- INT:** That information would be in that computer? So basically the plane would fly itself back over that—
- TOM:** No. You'd have to have what they called offset positions set in, in order for the airplane to fly there. I'm pretty sure the airplane could fly itself to the crosshairs, but as far as flying it to another point, I don't think it could. It couldn't solve that problem unless you had points put in. In order for us to over fly a given point, the radar and the navigator could've done it from inside the airplane. In effect, they could've navigated us right to that spot. But we wouldn't necessarily have known where that thing was unless we either saw it, or were painting it with radar, or being told where it was, which I think was the more likely case.
- INT:** I think so too.
- TOM:** Okay. They would've said, 'We want you to fly 2 miles south of Lansford.' Well, we could see Lansford. You could see the lights of towns. You could see those lights at pattern altitude and you don't forget. A normal mission comprised probably 4 to 10 approaches on a sortie, so month after month, year after year of doing this stuff, these pilots and navigators knew that. Let's say you're a pilot and you'd be waiting to have ground control approach turn you to base leg, let's say. You knew it was coming because you'd look out the window and there was Lansford and when Lansford's about there is when we're gonna get our call, you know?

- INT:** Right. Runyon remembers being told to film the object, which is confusing because the only camera that could've filmed that would've been the bomb camera, and the only way for that camera to run would be if they opened the bomb doors, correct?
- TOM:** No. When they're talking about film you're talking about radar picture.
- INT:** So there was no way to shoot film to the ground?
- TOM:** Unless we had a camera.
- INT:** When you dropped a bomb, there was no camera that recorded that bomb impact?
- TOM:** No But if you're taking a picture of the radar scope and you know your altitude, your heading, your air speed and the release time and point, which you could do then you know where your bomb would drop. But no way, shape or form would there ever be—other than tests now, you know. I worked with Rockwell and we had cameras that would film separations and drops and all kinds of things so we could study effects, but not in a B-52.
- INT:** Do you remember being ordered to over fly this object?
- TOM:** I want to be careful with this because I've heard it. No, I don't remember. But one thing you learn to do in the airplane is that you listen to what you need to be listening to. And you might be involved, or they're talking to another crewmember or whatever. Although, if a General told us to over fly a certain point it would've been crew knowledge, not necessarily individual knowledge, and the transcript that I saw didn't reflect the fact that we did over fly. Did we?
- INT:** Apparently you did, yeah.
- TOM:** Okay. So therefore then there's a break in the transcript of the ground control approach while we were doing that.
- INT:** Apparently you were ordered not to land, but to go back, over fly the object low-level.
- TOM:** 1,200 feet. Okay. Then my recollection of that is not real clear. What my recollection is Brad is seeing something, and Brad, being on the right side of the airplane means that if the thing was on our right side he's the only one that's gonna see it.

INT: Yeah.

TOM: The pilot, being on the left side, he physically can't see around. The IP could stand up and lean forward and look around, but if it was to our right hand quadrant, either off our wing or further back behind us, the only person in the airplane that could see it was Brad, and Brad was seeing it, and he described it as a yellow football—

INT: Now do you remember if that was his initial recall, or during the over flight?

TOM: I remember it—

INT: Let's put it this way—you actually had interaction with that object twice and both times your radios went dead.

TOM: The radios went dead. Okay, now you're really telling me something. No, I didn't know that. My recollection is that when we were at altitude that not only did the radars see it, but Brad saw it, then when we're really getting a good look at it, which obviously was the low-level, Brad is also the one seeing it. To me it was on our right rear. And I want to say something on this record here. If Brad Runyon saw that thing, he saw it. It was there.

INT: Qualify that.

TOM: Because of the credibility of that individual. He was a very professional person and morally, I mean, you could trust that guy to the end of the earth, and he didn't imagine anything. I mean everything would've been real time, genuine and described to the best of his knowledge and for everybody else's benefit. It was totally creditable.

INT: Okay. You guys are good friends?

TOM: We were good friends. Oh yeah, crewmembers were very close.

INT: In your initial interview with Jim Klotz, you mentioned that Brad saw the object out of his window, this football object—that there was a glow in the cockpit. Could you talk about that?

TOM: Okay. I looked around to the cockpit. I could turn physically like this and see up into the cockpit area.

INT: Could you see the pilots?

- TOM:** Yeah, I could see their shoulders; I could see the right shoulder and helmet of the pilot and the left shoulder and helmet of the co-pilot, although I'm restrained by my harnesses. And low-level I wouldn't have unstrapped to get out of my seat for any reason, and the IP seat would've been occupied with probably Cagle if Partin was in the pilot seat, so there wouldn't have been room for me up there anyway. But when I turned and looked I would have to stretch my imagination to say there was a glow in the cockpit, and the reason that I say that, because if I had been watching the cockpit and saw it was dark, and then turned around and saw it was lighter, yeah. So the best recollection I can give you is that, yeah, there could've been, or either was a glow in the cockpit, versus, there was no glow in the cockpit 'cause it was totally black. Now if Brad described the light coming from that as yellow, which he did I obviously would've been looking for that.
- INT:** I'm going to show you this drawing, which shows how they over flew the object. Here's their flight path over the object. If you want to comment on it, please do.
- TOM:** [Laughs]. Brad is shouldering all this on his own. And the co-pilot—sorry Brad, but the co-pilot was of such a position on the crew that he didn't direct the crew, but if he had to do stuff because nobody else was doing it Brad would be a guy that would do.
- INT:** Well, understand something—Cagle had left the flight deck to go into his bunk.
- TOM:** Okay, the bunk is just a matter of a couple of feet.
- INT:** The point is he said, 'I don't want anything to do with it' and so basically it's Runyon's department. Now Runyon's working the radio—
- TOM:** He would be taking the ground control approach, and I would've had the command post radio, other than if General (blank), whoever that was, got on the radio—Cagle would've wanted to talk to him, or the pilot flying the aircraft would've wanted to talk to him as opposed to me. My position was more or less a relay or a monitor.
- INT:** Does it make sense to you that he [Cagle] would go to his bunk?
- TOM:** Absolutely. And for the purposes stated, 'Hey, I want to stay out of this.'
- INT:** McCaslin stated he wasn't about to leave his ejection seat during this incident. You have a tense situation and the aircraft commander can leave the flight deck?

- TOM:** I was never in fear that we were unsafe, and I don't believe the pilot's were, and the airplane was in a safe configuration and I didn't feel that we were in jeopardy, but McCaslin might've felt that way.
- INT:** Well, I think McCaslin's comment was they'd never seen anything approach that fast. And then when they realized how large it is, and that it was pacing them—I mean that implies an intelligence.
- TOM:** Okay, he had more information to process than I did, or Cagle did. I felt safe. I didn't see the gunner panicking. I do remember an excitement from downstairs. Whether that was both Ritchey and McCaslin—although excitement, you know, you live together with these guys and all of a sudden something exciting happens enough to wake me up and be alert, yeah, there was stuff going on. I didn't feel concern for safety.
- INT:** Were you ever invited to the cockpit to look at the object?
- TOM:** No. I know I never had an inclination or impulse to unstrap and go see it. You don't unstrap from an ejection seat low altitude by procedure, you know, so you'd been doing something not by the book if you did that.
- INT:** But look at the drawing on the 3rd page there. [Looking at Runyon's drawing].
- TOM:** Jeez. Brad—I didn't know all this happened. Again, my recollection is that the object was out Brad's window 'cause Brad was the one seeing it. Which would've meant the right side of the airplane. This shows the left side of the airplane. Even according to his drawing.
- INT:** Do you recall that object being described in that fashion?
- TOM:** No.
- INT:** Brad never talked about it?
- TOM:** Brad's description that came over intercom was it was kind of a reddish, orangish football shape. And so he got more specific by seeing that and if Jack Partin didn't see this, I don't understand that. If Brad said it, it's good.
- INT:** Yeah. How long did you guys fly together?
- TOM:** I'd say a minimum of a year but probably more like a year and a half, maybe 2 years.
- INT:** Qualify that—I mean why do you say that about Brad?

TOM: Because of my admiration and respect for Brad. Everybody that's on a crew, you live together when you're on alert. Now other than sleeping together, we ate together, we watched movies together, we went to the gym together, we went to the BX together, all in this truck, and we all had to know where everybody was, so that if there was an alert you could all get to your airplane in the specific amount of time to get it running. Yeah, but we knew each other very well.

INT: You don't recall being ordered to go back over and fly this thing?

TOM: I remember the transcript said 1,200 feet was our altitude that we were flying under radar control. If we went visual, you can go down to a thousand feet, or maybe even more. I don't remember. I'm not a pilot and I wouldn't know what the rules of flight are for visual flying, but in order to over fly a certain point, the pilot would've been visual. VFR—visual flight rules, okay?

INT: Do you remember landing after that flight?

TOM: Kinda. But events that happened from landing to getting home we did again and again and they're always the same. You'd taxi in, you'd park the airplane, you'd unload the airplane, you'd get on the bus, you'd go through the 781 and write up discrepancies, finish off paperwork—flight paperwork. We had to go to maintenance debriefing.

INT: Did you have to go to a certain command post—what was the actual procedure?

TOM: Okay, as electronic warfare officer one of my crew responsibilities was taking care of all the classified material that we had. So I had to go into the wing headquarters—not necessarily the command post, but another area so that I could deposit the classified communications information and crew materials that we would normally carry. And normally the pilots would go to the command post and drop off the mission paperwork, and I would go and take care of the classified material.

INT: Classified—you mean like protocols and stuff like that?

TOM: There were some classified documents that we would carry that were procedural type documents. There was a coding system to so that you would be able to validate with current codes information that was passed to you, so that somebody couldn't feed you erroneous information. You could ask them to validate by a certain coding system, and those codes were classified.

INT: Okay, what was your classification?

TOM: I was Top Secret, ESI.

TOM: Now, I don't know how quick you think this all happens, but from landing time, taxi time, bus time, maintenance debriefing, prepare to go into debriefing, have a beer, get into debriefing, get back on the bus, get back to the wing headquarters and be done so you can walk out to your cars—probably beyond an hour, maybe an hour and a half.

INT: Okay, the debriefing, what does that entail?

TOM: It was formal debriefing. Each aircraft specialty—engines, radar, electronic countermeasures, gunnery, hydraulics, electrical—those maintenance people would all be there and then we as a crew would go in and we'd sit pilot, co-pilot, radar nav, nav, EW, gunner and they would read our write-ups, and then if there was a question on understanding what the write-up meant, we would verbally communicate to tell 'em. Once it was all understood, they'd say, 'Thank you very much.' They'd go work on the airplane, or make work orders to work on the airplane, and we would pack up our stuff and go back out on the bus.

INT: Do you remember that evening if there was any discussion of the UFO event?

TOM: Not a formal discussion. More or less, 'What the hell was going on?' I said this before. and I want to say it again, if we as a crew were gonna fabricate a good interesting story so we could take a departure from boredom, # 1—there wouldn't have been enough time to do that, #2—it didn't happen. If there was anything mentioned about the experience that we had, it was more interest from everybody, 'What the heck was going on? What'd you see?' It would've been eclipsed by the normal things that had to be done, that you were all interested in getting done, so therefore you couldn't spend a whole lot of time talking about this. We were still working, and we weren't done working until we put everything away in the wing headquarters and walked out. Then we were done. But then everybody's interest was going home, man. We're dead tired.

INT: Do you have a recall of a further debriefing on this instance?

TOM: Yeah. We were told either in the bus, at maintenance debriefing, on the airplane sometime prior to everybody leaving wing headquarters and going home that we were to come back in at such a time in the morning and be in General's office, okay? And the General, to me, was General Thompson.

- INT:** Why was it General Thompson?
- TOM:** Because, he was the General that I knew personally. I was in his house, had a beer with him in his house. I knew him a little bit, not very much, and that's why I think it was him. But he might be the only General name that I remember being up there. I thought that he was the division commander, but if he wasn't listed as an ex-division—he might've been the missile wing commander.
- INT:** Okay.
- TOM:** And the missile wing commander may have been a Brigadier General versus the flying wing commander was a O-6 Colonel.
- INT:** Yeah. In fact, the division commander at that time was a Colonel and then he was promoted.
- TOM:** Maybe I'm thinking we went to a General's office and we actually went to a Colonel's office. Although I knew that the office we went to was not the flying wing commander—was not in the flying wing.
- INT:** Okay.
- TOM:** It was down where the missile area was. It was not familiar surroundings to us.
- INT:** It must not be, because all you guys have sort of odd memories of it, it wasn't normal routine for you.
- TOM:** Oh no, certainly not normal. Down where the tanker squadron was and the missile area was, which is not where I remember division headquarters being. And we went into that debriefing and it wasn't real cordial, it didn't seem. The way I remember it, it was just very matter-of-fact and, in other words, there was nothing light about it from—
- INT:** You guys all walked together to this room?
- TOM:** Yeah.
- INT:** Was Partin there?
- TOM:** Yeah, I think we went in as a group, yeah.
- INT:** Okay. Was Cagle there?
- TOM:** Yeah, he would've been there.

- INT:** He would've been there?
- TOM:** Maybe not. If he was off doing his interview [laughs].
- INT:** Apparently he was on his way to Atlanta.
- TOM:** All right. Which meant then that the spokesman for the crew would've most likely been Ritchey because he would've been the most ranking person, although I believe he was a captain and I was a captain. But normally the hierarchy of the crew, you would consider pilot, radar nav, any co-pilot, EW, navigator, gunner, you know, some mix of that. But if the pilot wasn't there, then radar probably would've been the responsible party for the group.
- INT:** Do you remember being in that office? What were you being asked?
- TOM:** It was very incomplete, as though almost like we were trying to contribute some of our experience, you know, like McCaslin might've been talking a little more than he was being asked, or Brad, or maybe the two would even be talking up at the same time to try to make a point. I don't remember it being very professional results. I remember it as being insufficient.
- INT:** In what sense?
- TOM:** The right questions weren't asked by the interviewers. I believe there was another person in the room.
- INT:** So you're all sitting there—you're all on one side of a desk and he's—
- TOM:** Or we're sitting around. I don't believe we were in a straight line. It was more of an arch-type deal and the General was behind his desk and it was not a small office. It was what you'd normally expect, probably about the size of this room.
- INT:** What sorts of questions were you being asked?
- TOM:** 'What the hell happened?' 'What'd you all see?' Like I say, it was professionally insufficient and the way I remember walking out of there—we may have gotten together afterwards and said, 'Why did they ask us this and that?' but they did say to us don't discuss this with anybody. Okay, and when you hear that and for me, you don't discuss it. You kind of stop telling everybody about specifics, or whatever. And Brad being a by-the-book guy would've said another word.
- INT:** Did they provide you with any information about this incident?

TOM: No specifics. I think that they said, you know, other people saw some stuff and there was various reports of this and that—I don't know where we would've heard, other than there, that the alarm, intrusion alarms at—

INT: Did you hear that?

TOM: Yes, I do remember hearing that and it could've been in that briefing. But I don't remember the General saying that. I remember discussion, yes. Here's what I remember about that—there were intrusions alarms that went off but there was no forced entry in all cases except for one place, but then that didn't make sense because a perimeter entry was not violated, so how did somebody get through barrier 1 to get to barrier 2, and some of those things were pointed out to us. And here's what went through my head, and this is what stayed with me—if there was an unusual encounter with something beyond what we knew about, their interest may have been a nuclear warhead, or the material contained in a nuclear warhead, if their interest was getting to a missile silo. That, #1, they would've known that material was there by some indication or some sensing or some perception other than happenstance. So that's what went through my head, and obviously radioactive material may have been something that they needed to power their vehicle or equipment, or whatever. And I don't believe that this was discussed with anybody either.

INT: How long did this debriefing last?

TOM: More than 5 minutes less than a half an hour. Probably shorter—20 minutes.

INT: Can we try and identify this other person that was with the General? I mean you feel it was somebody from on base?

TOM: I feel it was somebody on base, and I feel that it was somebody I didn't know.

INT: So he could've been from the Strategic Missile Wing?

TOM: Yeah. He could've even been from the Bomb Wing. It was just somebody I didn't know. He probably wasn't a General Officer. He might've been a Maj—it probably was an officer. I don't think the rest of the crew knew who it was either.

INT: Did you know Colonel Werlich?

TOM: No.

INT: Well, during the debriefing apparently the General officer told you guys at the time that there had been an intrusion, and one of the blast doors had been moved. Now that's a 20-ton blast door on rails so that's no small feat.

TOM: If he would've said, 'blast door' then I believe I knew enough at that time that I would've known what a blast door was and that would've registered. What registered with me was a maintenance entry door.

INT: Okay, so the point is that during the debriefing, it's claimed that the GO told you guys that they sent out two security personnel out in the security vehicle—they didn't hear from 'em. They got concerned, they sent out a second team of security personnel—two guys. These guys got to the site, and I'm not sure what the site is. When this other security team got up to the site, they found the two security personnel unconscious on the ground with the paint burned off the top of their vehicle, and the perimeter fence around the silo smashed to the ground.

TOM: Have you got this as a recorded documentation from the people that got there—the second crew? Whether they told us that—

INT: That's what Brad [recalls].

TOM: All right. Here's the absolute truth—when you say those things, there's haziness in my mind. Whether that makes me recall it, or now I'm recalling it 'cause you said it—Okay. Let's leave it in extreme haze, as far as I'm concerned.

TOM: Okay. Let me go back to Brad again—if Brad says that in our debriefing, first off, who in that debriefing, his would be the most attentive, responsive and responsible—who's going to be the most...Brad, right?

INT: Mm-hmm.

TOM: Most of this is on Brad's shoulders. If Brad, from that debriefing, said that the General said that the blast door was moved, not the crew, not the maintenance entry door—if Brad said that, that's what it was.

INT: We're also talking about security personnel unconscious on the ground, the security vehicle with the paint burned off the roof, and a fence smashed down, you know?

TOM: The fence was smashed in?

- INT:** The fence was smashed to the ground as though some heavy weight had collapsed it on one side.
- TOM:** Okay, see, now this is a little different. What I had heard was that intrusion alarms occurred but there was no damage to the outer perimeter, which was a cyclone fence.
- INT:** Right, that's in the documents, too.
- TOM:** Well then...but now you're telling me the fence was crushed.
- INT:** Well, I'm telling you that's what Brad claims to have been told by this GO at the debriefing.
- TOM:** It...it's accurate, and I would pay more attention to that.
- INT:** Do you remember leaving the debriefing?
- TOM:** Kind of, but like I say, my recall of that was, 'Is this all they want?' Or they didn't get all the information that I know was available.
- INT:** Um, I mean, here's a question that other people have asked—that as soon as they're...why...if...if in fact the...the officer provided that information about the nuclear incident aspect of the UFO sighting, 'cause essentially what's being implied here is that the UFO had some effect on a missile silo, okay? Why would he tell you that if that were the case? If it was Brad saying it's true and that he was told this, why would the General provide that information to you guys?
- TOM:** He would've done it in a sense of maybe trying to reinforce us that he would not think that we're all hogwash.
- INT:** Your credibility was on the line.
- TOM:** Yeah, our credibility would've been reinforced by him saying, 'Now whatever you guys saw—' But now on the other side of that sword, I would have to say that maybe some of my disappointment at the debriefing was that they didn't seem to be taking it as serious as I thought they should've been.
- INT:** Yeah.
- TOM:** ...going on. And all of a sudden there wasn't, and this is the person responsible for making it continue or stop, and it appeared that it wasn't...wasn't good enough.

- INT:** Yeah.
- TOM:** After this long term, meaning a day, a week, a month, a year—after the event there wasn't that much discussion about it.
- INT:** Yeah. I mean, why would you guys discuss it?
- TOM:** Personally we all knew better.
- INT:** Now, I mentioned the possibility that Arlie Judd had this thing on his radar.
- TOM:** I don't remember that. If he had his equipment on—
- INT:** Would it have been on at that time?
- TOM:** No. It would not have been on. It would've been the same as mine. Those are big power requirements off of the alternators and you power down everything if it's not essential for critical phases of flight, which is penetration, approach and landing. So his gunnery equipment, which was rear-facing radar would've been powered down.
- INT:** Now Judd says his radar was on.
- TOM:** Okay. Now it could've been that maybe his procedure was not to turn it off until the ground.
- INT:** Judd had the radar on and did see it.
- TOM:** Did see it? Okay. If he did see it, I sat next to Judd and I could've gone like this and looked at it.
- INT:** And you don't recall that?
- TOM:** I don't recall doing it, but that wouldn't say that it wasn't there. It could've been that he saw it when I was looking at my scope for frequencies or something like that. You know, we all have different specialties and we're all doing our thing, we're doing it independently of each other.
- INT:** Right. At what point were ordered to do a survey of the electronic spectrum?
- TOM:** No, I don't remember being ordered, but I did one, and whether I thought that one up on my own—in fact, if I were to choose between the two, I think I did it on my own without being ordered to do it.

Let me make a general comment again. I want to reinforce something. I didn't see an unidentified flying object, but I was obviously present when experiences were being made by other members of our crew, and I want to bring credibility on the people that had those experiences, therefore, to me, that's my biggest testimony in this—that that happened. Those things happened, and whatever the descriptions were by them, they're totally correct.

INT: How many years did you fly B-52's?

TOM: Well, I have 5,400 hours total flying time. I have 3,400 hours in a B-52.

INT: Did you ever have any other experience similar to this?

TOM: No.

INT: In your whole career this was a unique event?

TOM: Yes. But not only do I believe that we're not alone in the universe, but I'd like to know more about it, so, you know I'm open to anything. I don't exclude anything because it's not explainable. I'm not narrow-minded, let's put it that way—as far as this goes.

[Transcript end]